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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DOCTRINE OF "ELECTION OF REMEDIES" IS NOT 
APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ENTERED 
INTO BY THE PARTIES SPECIFIES MR. INGRAM'S REMEDY. 
Between June 1 and September 10, 2001, Mr. Ingram 
supplied labor and material for the improvement of Mr. 
Kitts'1 Park City real property. Mr. Kitts refused to pay 
Mr. Ingram the amount due, forcing Mr. Ingram to file the 
case at bar. Mr. Kitts' transparent purpose for doing so 
was to try to save himself a few dollars by coercing Mr. 
Ingram into accepting a lesser sum than that which was truly 
owed. Mr. Ingram is a small general contractor and Mr. 
Kitts' refusal to pay the amount due caused both Mr. Ingram 
and his subcontractors substantial hardship. Two and one-
half years later, the day before the trial of this action 
was scheduled to take place, the parties entered into the 
Settlement Agreement at issue. 
The Settlement Agreement, which was drafted by Mr. 
Kitts' counsel, required Mr. Kitts to pay Mr. Ingram 
$68,757.26 on or before March 19, 2003. (R. 0283-288) 
Despite his promise to do so, Mr. Kitts has never paid any 
of the settlement amount. The Settlement Agreement 
xFor simplicity, defendants Brian Kitts and Sunpeak 
Holdings, Inc., will be referred to collectively as Mr. Kitts. 
1 
specifically provides that "[i]n the event Kitts and Sunpeak 
fail to pay Ingram the Settlement Amount ... Ingram shall be 
entitled to judgment against Kitts and Sunpeak as prayed for 
in the Amended Complaint..." (R. 0284-0285)(emphasis added). 
At issue on this appeal is whether Mr. Ingram is entitled to 
judgment in accordance with the parties' specific and 
unqualified agreement, i.e., "as prayed for in the Amended 
Complaint," or whether Mr. Kitts is entitled to in effect 
unilaterally renegotiate the deal after the fact and/or 
assert defenses which he might have if he had elected to go 
to trial. 
Had Mr. Kitts elected to try this case, Mr. Ingram may 
or may not have prevailed on his claim for statutory damages 
as prayed for in Count Four of the Amended Complaint. Mr. 
Kitts chose not do so, however, and he unequivocally agreed 
that if he failed to pay the settlement amount Mr. Ingram 
would be entitled to judgment as "as prayed for in the 
Amended Complaint." The Amended Complaint specifically 
prays for "statutory damages in the amount of $20,245.07." 
(R. 0056) Mr. Kitts' agreement that Mr. Ingram would be 
entitled to judgment as prayed for in the Amended Complaint 
was central to Mr. Ingram's decision to enter into the 
2 
Settlement Agreement. Mr. Ingram respectfully submits that 
Mr. Kitts should be required to honor his agreement. 
In Royal Resources, Inc., v. Gibralter Financial Corp., 
603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979), the Supreme Court stated that 
the defense of election of remedies may be waived. Of 
particular relevance to the case at bar, the Court 
specifically recognized that litigants may choose to "enter 
into a stipulation at variance with [the doctrine of 
election of remedies]." Id. Accordingly, even if the 
doctrine of election of remedies would otherwise apply to 
this case (which as further demonstrated below it would 
not), by agreeing that Mr. Ingram would be entitled to 
judgment as prayed for in the Amended Complaint, Mr. Kitts 
clearly waived that defense. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION OF REMEDIES IS NOT APPLICABLE 
BECAUSE THE REMEDIES WHICH MR. KITTS AGREED TO ARE 
CONSISTENT. 
Much of Mr. Kitts' argument is premised upon his 
contention that Mr. Ingram is required to make an election 
of remedies because Counts One and Four of the Amended 
Complaint pray for "inconsistent" remedies. See Royal 
Resources, supra, 603 P.2d at 796 (the doctrine of election 
of remedies presupposes a choice between inconsistent 
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remedies). Mr. Kitts is clearly mistaken. 
To the extent that their compensatory components 
overlap, the remedies prayed for in Counts One and Four of 
the Amended Complaint are concurrent and completely 
consistent. See, e.g., Equitable Life Leasing Corp. v. 
Abbick, 757 P.2d '304, 306 (Kan. 1988) ("An election is 
required only when claims are inconsistent, such as where 
one claim alleges what the other denies, or the allegations 
are mutually repugnant"). Generally, remedies are 
inconsistent when they are based upon incompatible facts. 
Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 
289 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Utah 1955). The facts alleged in Count 
One of Mr. Ingram's Amended Complaint are fully compatible 
with the facts alleged in Count Four. Count One alleges 
that Mr. Kitts failed and refused to honor his contractual 
obligations; Count Four alleges that Mr. Kitts' bank failed 
to honor his checks. 
The "test of inconsistency" is set forth in 25 Am Jur 
2d, Election of Remedies § 20, p.679, as follows: 
For inconsistency to act as a bar, the remedies must 
proceed from opposite and irreconcilable claims of 
right, and must be so inconsistent that a party could 
not logically follow one without renouncing the other. 
It is clear that Counts One and Four of Mr. Ingram's Amended 
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Complaint pass this test. They do not proceed from opposite 
and irreconcilable claims of right and Mr. Ingram was 
entitled follow both without renouncing either one. Thus, 
contrary to Mr. Kitts' contention, the remedies prayed for 
in Counts One and Four are consistent with each other. 
When remedies are consistent, it is the satisfaction of 
one which operates as a bar to satisfaction of the other. 
Farmers and Merchants Bank, supra, 289 P.2d at 1049. As a 
consequence, to the extent that they overlap, Mr. Ingram 
would not be entitled to satisfaction of the compensatory 
damages prayed for in Count One and also to satisfaction of 
the compensatory damages prayed for in Count Four because 
satisfaction of one bars satisfaction of the other. 
However, after full satisfaction of his compensatory 
damages, Mr. Ingram would still be entitled to satisfy the 
statutory damages prayed for in Count Four. 
III. THE PURPOSE AND INTENT OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS 
THAT MR. KITTS' FAILURE TO PAY THE SETTLEMENT AMOUNT 
WOULD RESULT IN THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT "AS PRAYED FOR IN 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT" JUST AS IF THE PARTIES HAD GONE 
TO TRIAL AND MR. INGRAM HAD FULLY PREVAILED ON ALL OF 
HIS CLAIMS. 
Mr. Kitts contends that "[t]he purpose and intent of 
the Settlement Agreement is carried into effect by the Court 
applying the principle that compensation under Count I is 
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tantamount to a ^payment made prior to Entry of Judgment' 
under the Settlement Agreement."2 This contention is 
fantastic. 
"That a mere promise to pay cannot of itself be 
regarded as an effective payment is manifest." Farmers and 
Merchants Bank, supra, 289 P.2d at 1049 (quoting 40 Am Jur, 
Payment, § 87). It is equally obvious that the Judgment 
entered in Mr. Ingram's favor on Count One is not tantamount 
to a "payment made prior to the Entry of Judgment." In 
point of fact, Mr. Kitts has still not paid any of the 
Judgment amount and has gone so far as to file petitions for 
relief in bankruptcy court to avoid having to do so. 
Conversely, Mr. Ingram respectfully submits that the 
purpose and intent of the Settlement Agreement is clear. 
Mr. Ingram agreed to compromise his claims, including his 
claim for statutory damages, provided that Mr. Kitts paid 
the settlement amount on or before March 19, 2003. In 
consideration thereof, Mr. Kitts agreed that his failure to 
pay the settlement amount would entitle Mr. Ingram to the 
entry of judgment "as prayed for in the Amended Complaint," 
just as if the parties had gone to trial and Mr. Ingram had 
2Brief of Appellees at p. 13. 
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fully prevailed on all of his claims, including his claim 
for "statutory damages in the amount of $20,245.07." (R. 
0056). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Ingram respectfully 
requests that the trial court's June 30, 2003 Order be 
reversed to the extent that it denies Mr. Ingram judgment in 
accordance with Count Four of the Amended Complaint and that 
this action be remanded to the trial court with instructions 
for the entry of judgment in Mr. Ingram's favor for 
statutory damages in the amount of $20,245.07, returned 
check fees of $40.00, interest, and attorney fees incurred 
both before the trial court and in connection with this 
appeal. 
DATED this Z^*-^ day of November 2004. 
J 
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